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Notes
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention:
A Suggested Analysis
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention attempts to pro-
vide uniform rules for the situs of suits arising out of
international air accidents. The author of this Note, after
discussing the four contacts enumerated in article
28(1), concludes that the presence of any contact in the
United States should authorize suit in any internal
judicial subdivision, while an absence of contacts should
remove the subject matter jurisdiction of American
courts.
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air,' the Warsaw Convention,2
is a multilateral treaty applicable to most international air trans-
portation' providing uniform rules for the determination of carrier
liability in cases arising out of international aviation.4 Although
it has been the law of the land for over thirty years, neither the
1. 40 Stat. 3000 (1934); T.S. No. 876; 137 L.N.T.S. 11, No. 3145 [herein-
after cited as Warsaw Convention]. A translation by the United States De-
partment of State from the official French text appears at 2 Av. L. REP.
27,011 (1964). The convention was signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, and
took effect on Feb. 13, 1933.
2. See GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CON-
VENT oN 4-6 (1937); Mennell & Simeone, United States Policy and the War-
saw Convention, 2 WAsBURN L.J. 219, 220-21 (1962).
3. GoEDHms, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1-2.
4. Article 1(2) makes the convention applicable to "any transportation in
which according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure
and the place of destination ... are situated . .. within the territories of two
High Contracting Parties," or the place of departure and the place of destina-
tion is "within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory subject to . . . another power even
though that power is not a party to this convention." The convention, there-
fore, does not apply to all air transportation, nor even to all international
transportation. For a good discussion of conditions necessary for application
of the convention, see Mennell & Simeone, supra note 2, at 224-28.
5. Adherence advised by U.S. Senate on June 15, 1934; adherence de-
clared on June 27, 1934; proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934); T.S.
No. 876. The Warsaw Convention is recognized as self executing. See
Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venazolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957). Because
article 22(1) of the convention limits carrier's liability to $8,300, the State
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courts nor the commentators have been able to agree on interpre-
tations of some of its basic provisions. A major unsettled area
involves the construction of article 28 of the Convention which
provides:
(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plain-
tiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before
the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of busi-
ness, or where he has a place of business through which the contract
has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.
(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court
to which the case is submitted.
This Note will determine the circumstances under which an
American court can adjudicate actions governed by the Warsaw
Convention, focusing first on the location of the four contacts
enumerated in article 28(1). Next, the question of whether these
contacts refer to nations or to political subdivisions will be dis-
cussed. Finally, this Note will attempt to determine whether
article 28 is a jurisdictional or a venue provision.
I. THE CONTACTS SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 28(1).
Article 28(1) lists four contacts, at least one of which must
be found in the jurisdiction where the action is to be heard.
A. Dom=cu
The carrier's domicile is the place of its incorporation
B. PpmqcIpAL PLcE oF Businmss
This is the place where a carrier's executive and main adminis-
trative functions are located and where most of its business is
transacted.7
Department has announced plans for serving notice of the United States'
denunciation of the convention as provided by article 89. The State Depart-
ment wants the liability limitation raised to $100,000 per passenger. The
subsequent resolution of the International Air Transport Association to raise
the liability to $50,000 has not changed the State Department's position. 2
Av. L. REP., Nov. 8, 1965, No. 376, p. 3 (report letter).
6. See Cha, The Air Carrier's Liability to Passengers in International Law,
7 Am L. Rnv. 25, 60 (1936); McKenmy, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw
Convention, 29 J. Am L. & CoMvMEmcE 205, 208-09 (1968).
7. See McKenry, supra note 6, at 209. An isolated decision has construed
this contact as meaning merely a principal place of business. Winsor v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). However, this decision has
been criticized and never followed. Nudo v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,
207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962); McKenry, supra note 6, at 210.
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C. PLACE OF BusnmEss THROUGH WHICH THE CONTRACT HASB~n MADE
The third contact may be easily determined if the ticket is sold
by an office of the defendant carrier. The determination becomes
difficult, however, when the ticket or air waybill is sold either by
another airline pursuant to an interagency agreement, or by a
travel agent authorized to issue tickets for the carrier. A literal
reading of article 28(1) appears to preclude a court from exercising
jurisdiction when a litigant claims only the third contact is present
and the ticket has not been sold by an office of the defendant
carrier.8 Rotterdamache Bank N.V. v. British Overseas Airways
Corp.'9 provides an extreme example of literal interpretation.
There the plaintiff attempted to recover from Aden Airways for
a shipment of gold lost in Africa. The contract of carriage with
Aden was made by British Overseas Airways Corporation
(BOAC) in London. BOAC regularly handled the English
business of Aden, its foreign, separately incorporated subsidiary.
The court dismissed the claim against Aden holding that the
purchase of a ticket in London from someone other than the de-
fendant carrier could not sustain the jurisdiction of an English
court. There is no evidence, however, that the court considered
the possibility of inferring an agency relationship between Aden
and BOAC.
A more liberal construction of the third contact enumerated
in article 28(1) has been obtained through a limited application
of agency principles. The court in Berner v. United Airlines,
Inc. ° refused to dismiss an action against British Commonwealth
Airways even though the ticket had been purchased in New York
from another airline, BOAC. The appointment of BOAC as
British Commonwealth's general sales agent in the United States
and the sale of tickets there by BOAC was thought to provide
a proper basis of jurisdiction. It would be a mistake to conclude,
however, that the result in Berner signals a decided shift to an
expanded use of agency concepts to satisfy the requirements of the
third contact. Since the destination of the trip was New York,
the Berner court clearly had jurisdiction by virtue of the place of
8. The article specifies "where he [the defendant carrier] has a place of
business through which the contract has been made." (Emphasis added.)
9. [1953] 1 All E.R. 675 (Q.B.).
10. 2 Misc. 2d 260, 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 9,
157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956), af'd, 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 147 N.E.2d 732, 170 N.Y.S.2d
340 (1957)
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destination contact; the agency rationale can be viewed as an
alternate holding at best. It is also significant to note that the
court in Berner stressed that the explicit agency relationship not
only imposed mutual affirmative duties in excess of those incident
to the usual sales agency agreement, but also covered an extensive
and persistent course of business." Arguably, casual sales either
by another airline or an authorized ticket agent are beyond the
Berner rationale.
The permissible limit to the use of agency theory under the
third contact has been further confused by the conflict in results
reached by a state and federal court passing on identical facts.
Plaintiff in California purchased a ticket for a flight to the Middle
East on United Arab Airlines. Although United Arab Airlines
maintained a New York ticket office, the ticket was purchased
through Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS).
The only possible jurisdictional claim under article 28(1) was
the purchase of the ticket in the United States from SAS. The
complaint in an action in the New York state court was dis-
missed. 2 Berner was distinguished because in that case a "con-
tinning agency" between the airlines was found sufficient to char-
acterize the BOAC office in New York as also an office of the
British Commonwealth. In the case before it, on the other hand,
the court found that the ticket sale arrangements between the
SAS office in California and United Arab fell short of providing
a persisting agency.'5 Plaintiff then commenced an action in a
federal district court of New York. 4 This court agreed with the
11. 2 Misc. 2d at 268, 149 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
12. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 20 App. Div. 2d 454, 247 N.Y.S. 2d
820, rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964).
18. The court characterized the SAS-United Arab ticket arrangement as
"ad hoc." The BOAC-British Commonwealth arrangement was described
as follows:
[here was some regularity in the sale of tickets . . .The agent was
required to observe and comply with all reasonable directions and
instructions. The Australian airline [British Commonwealth] on its part
undertook affirmative obligations to its general sales agent with respect
to equipment, personnel and standards of operation. There was even
provision made for procedures to be followed in the case of accidents.
Thus the finding of the maintenance of a place of business was based on
the fact of a continuing agency.
Id. at 464, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
14. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 9 Av. Cas. 17,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
reconsideration denied, 9 Av. Cas. 17,469 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The issues of
res judicata and full faith and credit were not considered because dismissal was
based on other grounds.
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prior New York decision and granted defendant's motion to dis-
miss. After the federal court's decision, however, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed the earlier determination in Eck v.
United Arab Airlines, Inc.'5 It held that the ticket sale need
not be made in an office of the defendant airline to satisfy the
third contact if the defendant maintains an office in the United
States. The decision does not appear to be based on the agency
principle, i.e., holding the SAS office (the actual seller) to be
defendant's office. Rather it is based upon the fact that United
Arab maintained a place of business in New York.'6 While the
court admitted that an office in this country alone would not
satisfy the contact if the sale had not been made in the United
States, it substituted the requirement of a domestic office for the
"persisting agency" requirement of Berner.
Considering the purpose and overall scheme of article 28(1),
the holding of the New York court in Eck represents the better
view. When the Convention was adopted, all airline bookings
were handled through the carrier's own offices. For all practical
purposes the place "through which the contract has been made"
was identical to "where he has a place of business through which
the contract has been made." Now, however, methods of booking
passage commonly include the purchase of tickets through travel
agents and other airlines. It is clear that if in Eck all ticket sales
had been made through the New York office of United Arab, juris-
diction would be unquestioned. Carriers should not be allowed to
deprive purchasers of access to domestic courts by changing their
ticket routing methods.' 7
Assuming, arguendo, that the court properly interrupted the
15. 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 NX-2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964).
16. At some point the travel agency or the airline which actually sells the
ticket must inform the carrier of the sale and transmit the money received.
If this is sent to a regional office, as in this case to United Arab's New York
office, a strong argument could be made that defendant's office is "his place
of business through which the contract was made." As far as the cases indi-
cate, this analysis has never been urged.
17. The anomalous results which follow from the literal reading of article
28(1) rendered in Rotterdamsehe Bank and Eck are easy to illustrate: two
New Yorkers each purchase a one way ticket on the same flight from New
York to Paris via Air France. One buys his ticket directly from an Air France
office in New York, the other procures his ticket from a New York travel
agent. If the two are injured during the flight, the first could bring a suit
against Air France in the United States. The second would be forced to sue
in France because under a literal construction none of the contacts would be
considered present in the United States.
1966]
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third contact in Eck, there appears to be no substantial obstacle
to substituting the "material and persistent" agency rationale of
Berner for the domestic office requirement of Eck. Hence, after
Eck, Berner could be read as sustaining jurisdiction under article
28(1) for even casual sales made in the United States by another
if the defendant has a "material and persistent" agency here,
whether or not the ticket sale was actually made through the
"general" agent.
In light of modern ticket selling technique, a definition of the
third contact based upon a literal reading of the article is no
longer desirable. The "place of contracting" requirement should
be satisfied whenever an authorized commercial sale is made on
behalf of the defendant carrier in the United States. This result
could be obtained without doing violence to the wording of article
28(1) by reading an expanded theory of agency into the third
contact. Admittedly, the fairness and desirability of requiring a
carrier to defend a suit anywhere in the world because a ticket has
been sold on his behalf by a travel agent or another carrier can be
questioned. However, all of the American decisions seem to recog-
nize that it is possible to satisfy the place of contracting contact
without having the sale actually made from defendant's place of
business. Furthermore, the carrier has voluntarily authorized the
ticket sale. In view of an airline's financial position, including
obvious transportation advantages, a "relative hardship" test for
conducting a suit in a foreign jurisdiction favors the passenger,
especially since the place of ticket purchase is usually the pass-
enger's home area. The argument that a carrier anticipates it
could be amenable to suit only if it opens an office lacks per-
suasive force. The same could be said of a carrier authorizing an-
other to solicit business and sell its tickets, as in Berner.
D. PLACE OF DESTINATION
The location of the fourth contact is controlled by the destina-
tion as shown on the contract of carriage.,' On a round trip flight
the place of destination is considered to be the ultimate destina-
tion of the trip, the place of origin. 9 The destination of transpor-
tation involving several flights is the last point in the contract of
18. Warsaw Convention art. 1(2).
19. Bowen v. Port of New York Authority, 8 Av. Cas. 18,043 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 1964); Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Int'l Airlines, 29 Misc. 2d 499, 211
N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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air carriage.20 If the transportation is to be performed by several
successive air carriers, the last point in the air carriage would be
considered the destination as long as the parties regarded the
movement as a single operation.?' An unscheduled landing
prompted by operational difficulties or the place of a crash is not
the place of destination for purposes of article 28(1). 2
EI. THE DETERANATION OF THE CONTACTS AS
EITHER LOCAL OR NATIONAL IN SCOPE
There has been disagreement over whether the contacts enu-
merated in article 28(1) refer to nations or only to the internal
judicial subdivisions of each nation. If the provisions refer only
to the nation, there is no need to go beyond the location of a
contact in the United States. If article 28(1) is deemed to set
local requirements, however, the contact would have to be found
inside the forum's territory before jurisdiction could be exercised.
Several federal district courts have adopted the local contact
approach. In Dunning v. Pan American World Airways, In.2 3
for example, the case was transferred from the District of Colum-
bia to New York because Pan American's domicile and principal
place of business were in New York.2 4 This transfer was made
even though Pan American had extensive facilities in the District
of Columbia. 5 On the other hand, one court which adopted the
20. See Wyman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 29 N.Y. 878, 59
N.2E.d 785 (1944); Felsenfeld v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 8 Av. Cas.
17,199 (N.Y. City Ct. 1962). But cf. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 856, 252 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
21. See Warsaw Convention art. 1(3); Berner v. United Airlines, Inc.,
tMisc. 2d 260, 264, 149 N.Y.S.2d 335, 341 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 3 App. Div. 2d
9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 147 N.E.2d 782, 170 N.Y.S.
2d 340 (1957); McKenry, supra note 8, at 215; cf. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., supra note 20.
22. GoEnmus, op. cit. supra note 2, at 288.
23. 4 Av. Cas. 17,394 (D.D.C. 1954). The decision has been criticized.
Robbins, Jurisdiction Under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, 9 McGn.
L.J. 353 (1963).
24. The only case cited by either side was Rotterdamsche Bank, N.V. v.
British Overseas Airways Corp., [1953] 1 All E.R. 675 (Q.B.), a British case
which dismissed an action because it held that none of the four contacts was
in Great Britain.
25. See McKenry, supra note 6, at 222. In Scarf v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 4 Av. Cas. 17,795 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, 233 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1956), plaintiff's complaint was dismissed on the basis of article 28(1)
although it was obvious that the defendant had its domicile and principal
1966]
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local contact theory retained jurisdiction by reading, "the prin-
cipal place of business" contact to mean a principal place of busi-
ness within the territory of the forum.26 This tortured construction
would have been unnecessary if the court had simply given article
28(1) a national construction. 7
A number of recent decisions have held that the provisions of
article 28(1) refer to the nation as a whole rather than to internal
judicial subdivisions. 28 Since the decisions involve similar facts,
one illustration will suffice.
In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,29 the decedent was on a
chartered flight from California to South Viet Nam. Flying Tiger
is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Burbank, California. It is clear the contract of carriage was not
made in New York. Thus, one contact, destination, was in Viet
Nam, three contacts were in the United States, none of which
were within New York. Nonetheless, suit was permitted in the
federal court in New York. The court held:
The places specified refer to the High Contracting Parties, not to
areas within a particular High Contracting Party. . . . Plaintiff's
choice of forum within that country is governed by the internal law,
with all its intricacies and complexities, not by the Warsaw Con-
vention8 o
A national construction of article 28(1) is supported by both the
legislative history of the Convention and by the desire to eliminate
a possible conflict between the Convention and procedural law
of the United States. In discussing article 28(1), the delegates
focussed on which countries would be acceptable forums. There
place of business in the United States. The plaintiff conceded that none of the
contacts were in New York, the forum, but did not argue for a "national"
construction of article 28(1).
26. Winsor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 244 (ELD.N.Y. 1957).
The defendant's domicile and principal place of business were in the United
States but not within the territory of the forum.
27. See Nudo v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).
28. Pardonnet v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 683 (ND). Ill. 1964)
(U.S. contacts: domicile, principal place of business, place of contracting);
Pitman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Pa.
1963) (U.S. contacts: domicile, principal place of business, destination);
Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(U.S. contacts: domicile, principal place of business). See Eck v. United
Arab Airlines, Inc., 9 Av. Cas. 17,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), reconsideration denied,
9 Av. Cas. 17,469 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (U.S. contact: place of contracting).
29. 841 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
30. Id. at 855. For statements supporting this position, see McKenry,
supra note 6, at 226; Robbins, supra note 23, at 356.
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is no indication of concern about which jurisdiction or court
within the various countries could try the action." As one federal
judge explained:
The Warsaw Convention was drafted in contemplation of adherence by
many nations with widely divergent systems of jurisprudence and court
structure. While the drafters . . . intended to limit the places where
damage suits could be brought, it seems unlikely that they were con-
cerned whether a suit properly brought in the United States was tried
in Philadelphia rather than New York.32
Nor is there any indication that the United States Senate under-
stood the Convention would have any impact upon the rules gov-
erning the choice of forum within the United States. Since the
above interpretation of article 28(1) does not offend the other
signatories of the Convention, there appears to be no reason to
interpret the article in a manner which would displace internal
law governing the place where suit may be brought 3 This con-
clusion is reinforced by the provision of article 28(2): "questions
of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which
the case is submitted." The "national" interpretation of article
28(1) "brings it into harmony with the federal judicial system
while giving it the full meaning and effect which must have been
intended by the high contracting parties to the convention. '
1II. THE DETERMINATION OF THE CONTACTS
AS RELATING EITHER TO JURISDICTION OR VENUE
Subject matter jurisdiction may be equated with the com-
petency of a court to adjudicate a case. Venue refers only to
31. Warsaw Conference Documents, pp. 77-79, quoted in Calkins, The
Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. Am L. & ComxRacE
217, 229 (1959).
32. Pitman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 887, 888
(ElD. Pa. 1963).
83. A probable explanation for the decisions construing the article as
"local" can be advanced. Article 28(1) refers to "the Court of the domicile
... or before the Court at the place of destination." (Emphasis added.) Taken
literally and isolated from legislative history, the wording appears to refer to
jurisdictional subdivisions not to entire countries. In addition, poor advocacy
may have contributed to the situation. None of the decisions indicated that
the legislative history had been raised by the plaintiff. In Scarf v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 4 Av. Cas. 17,795 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed,
233 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1956), the plaintiff apparently never even urged a na-
tional construction of article 28(1) but was content to contend that the Con-
vention was inapplicable to the case.
34. Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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the place of trial designed for the convenience of the litigants.
Objections to venue are privileges personal to the defendant and
may be waived. However, a judgment rendered by a court with-
out jurisdiction is void.
An examination of the consequences of either characterization
reveals that they are very similar in most contexts. The ability of
an American court to hear a case governed by the Convention is
not expanded by either construction of article 28(1) 5 However,
either construction could cause an American court to decline to
hear a suit it would otherwise entertain. If the article is a juris-
dictional provision, American courts are without power to adjudi-
cate suits involving flights covered by the Convention if none of
the four contacts are in the United States. 6 If article 28(1) be
construed as a venue provision, the same result would obtain.8 7
However the difference between a venue and a jurisdictional char-
acterization is crucial in a case in which none of the contacts are
in the United States but the defendant, believing the forum has
no jurisdiction, neglects to challenge venue. The court could first
hold article 28(1) to be a venue provision and then hold that any
objection to venue had been waived s Limiting the examination
to this sole crucial area, it is submitted that a jurisdictional con-
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1891 (1964) (general venue provisions for the federal
courts), provide:
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which
it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corpora-
tion for venue purposes.
(d) An alien may be sued in any district.
Since most airlines making international flights are corporations, it would
be difficult to imagine a situation where one of the contacts of article 28(1)
would add a forum not already covered by subdivision (c) or (d) especially
when one recalls that the contacts refer to nations and not to political sub-
divisions.
86. Nudo v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.). Pa.
1962).
37. Of course, an opinion dismissing the action because of no United
States contacts would do so on the basis of improper venue rather than lack
of jurisdiction. As a practical matter the result will be of no help to the plain-
tiff since the "proper venue" under article 28 (1) can only be in the countries
where the contacts occurred. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 9 Av. Cas.
17,322 (S-D.N.Y. 1964), reconsideration denied, 9 Av. Cas. 17,469 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
88. See Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504
(SI).N.Y. 1962); Brown v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 8 Av. Cas.
17,272 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Mason v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 5 Av. Cas.
17,121 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
[Vol. 50:697
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struction is preferable and reflects most accurately the literal
mandate of the article.
Although the decisions determining the issue have split, careful
analysis reveals that the cases viewing the article as a venue pro-
vision are only weak authority for that position. The first note-
worthy case viewing article 28(1) as a venue provision, Dunning
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,39 involved an international
flight with two contacts in the United States - both the defend-
ant's domicile and principal place of business were in New York.
Pan American was granted a change in venue from the District of
Columbia to New York even though it was amenable to suit and
had been properly served in the District of Columbia.40 On similar
facts, another federal court granted a motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint because of lack of proper venue.u As in Dunning, two
contacts were present in the United States, but neither was in the
court's geographical jurisdiction. In both cases the court simply
assumed a venue characterization of article 28(1). There is no
indication that either party urged jurisdictional construction.
In Mason v. British Overseas Airways Corp., two United
States contacts were present but none in the court's geographical
jurisdiction. The court, in effect, used a venue construction of
article 28(1) to retain the case since only jurisdiction and not
venue had been challenged. The court observed:
This court's jurisdiction, that is its power to hear and adjudicate the
controversy between these parties, is found either in 28 U.S.C.A.
1382(a)(2), or if it be contended that the action is one arising under a
treaty of the United States in 28 U.S.C.A. 1331. Article 28 of the Con-
vention seems to me clearly to relate only to venue which is merely a
limitation designed for the convenience of litigants and which is not
challenged by this motion. The Convention does not purport to take
away from the courts of any adhering nation the power to adjudicate
which the latter has granted them, or to grant such power to any court
not otherwise possessed of i. 48
In Mason, however, only the form of defendant's motion made
the court's venue characterization significant. If the defendant
had objected on both venue and jurisdictional grounds, the court,
following the local contacts view, would have been compelled to
dismiss the suit. Even assuming that a jurisdictional construction
would conflict with federal statutes covering jurisdiction of federal
39. 4 Av. Cas. 17,894 (D.D.C. 1954).
40. See McKenry, aupna note 6, at 222.
41. Scarf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 4 Av. Cas. 17,795 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
42. 5 Av. Cas. 17,121 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
43. Id. at 17,121-22.
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courts, the court's venue construction clearly conflicts with the
statutory venue provision."
Three other decisions are generally cited for the proposition
that article 28(1) is a venue provision. In Spencer V. Northwest
Airlines, Inc.,45 there were two United States contacts; the de-
fendant's domicile and principal place of business in Minnesota.
Except for alleged Warsaw Convention complications, it was clear
that the court had subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, and proper venue. The court's denial of
the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under article 28(1) has been interpreted as a determi-
nation that it is not a jurisdictional provision. This decision is
also entangled with the "national-local" issue. It is submitted that
a close examination of the opinion reveals that the court's position
is not really inconsistent with the view of the article as a juris-
dictional provision. Citing Mason, the court stated that: "There
it was squarely held that Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention
did not affect the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts
over a diversity action by an American citizen against an Ameri-
can air carrier. '46 This is a curious statement since in Mason the
defendants were foreign air carriers. 47 However, the statement is
correct for if the defendant is an American air carrier, at least two
contacts - domicile and principal place of business - will be in
the United States. The Spencer court went on to make a state-
ment generally cited for the proposition that article 28(1) relates
to venue:
In essence, Article 28 imposes a bar to the maintenance of an action
for damages against an air carrier covered by the Convention in any
court except in one of four places specifically authorized by the Article.
But basically this does not relate to the question of subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts of the United States regulated by Act
of Congress. I cannot conceive that it was the design or effect of Article
28, drafted in contemplation of adherence by many nations with widely
divergent systems of jurisprudence and court structure, to deal with
questions of technical subject matter jurisdiction within the framework
of the federal juridical system of the United States or to impinge upon
the jurisdiction conferred by Congress upon the federal courts.
In any event in so far as Article 28 would operate as a plea in bar
44. See note 35 supra.
45. 201 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
46. Id. at 506. (Emphasis added.)
47. Mason v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 5 Av. Cas. 17,121 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). There were two defendants in Mason, BOAC and British West
Indian Airways, Ltd., "a corporation organized pursuant to the laws ... of
Trinidad and Tobago, B. W. I."
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to the maintenance of an action for damages against an air carrier, it
seems to me to be concerned only with the question of -the circumstances
under which resort may be had to the national court system of one of
the high contracting parties as a forum available to a claimant in which
to pursue his remedies.4 8
The first sentence of the court's statement indicates rather
clearly that there can be no jurisdiction if none of the four con-
tacts are in the United States. It seems reasonable to interpret
the remainder of the first paragraph as applying only to the
internal operation of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The
phrase, "within the framework of the federal judicial system"
supports this reading. The next paragraph further discusses the
possibility that article 28(1) can withdraw jurisdiction from
American courts. It is suggested that the statement in Spencer
should be strictly viewed in the context in which the decision was
rendered, i.e., two contacts present in the United States. Thus,
the meaning of the court's statement is that if a contact is present
in the United States, the Warsaw Convention does not affect the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. It should be
noted that the Spencer court was the first to consider the "local-
national" issue and hold that the contacts of article 28(1) were
national in character and did not refer to political subdivisions of
a country. Thus, since the contacts were "national," a jurisdic-
tional or a venue construction was not outcome determinative
because the court could have retained the case under either con-
struction.
In Brown v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,49 a wrongful
death action arising from an international flight, the only
arguable United States contact was the ticket sale by TWA for
the defendant, Air France, in Washington, D.C. The court, in
denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
48. 201 F. Supp. at 507. It is unfortunate that the following paragraph
was included in the Spencer opinion:
The question remains as to whether Article 28 as a practical matter
should also be viewed as a special venue provision governing actions
coming under the Warsaw Convention and requiring that venue in such
actions be laid in the judicial district where one of the four requirements
of the Article is complied with. It is unnecessary here to decide that
question . . . defendant by serving its answer has waived its right to
object to venue ....
Ibid. As one writer commented, "Much of the force of the opinion, however,
is beclouded by [the above] paragraph." Robbins, aupra note 23, at 358. All
that can be added to this statement is that there is no authority for this
proposition and it has never been followed.
49. 8 Av. Cas. 17,272 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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was persuaded by Spencer that, "the authors of Article 28 could
not have intended it as a jurisdictional limitation as that term is
understood in our courts." 50 If the court considered the ticket sale
by TWA sufficient for locating the place of contracting contact
in the United States, then Brown is consistent with Spencer, in
finding subject matter jurisdiction is not affected if there is a
United States contact. If not, Brown represents the only decision
in which a court has refused to dismiss an action subject to the
Warsaw Convention where there were no United States contacts.
Most recently, in the federal district court's decision in Eck v.
United Arab Airlines, Inc.,5 1 the court held that although none of
the contacts of article 28(1) were present in the United States,
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction should be refused. Citing Spencer and Mason, the court
said, "The provisions of 28(1) have been held, in this District, not
to affect the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts over
such an action as this. Article 28(1) is not jurisdictional and its
only relation is to venue."'52 The court, however, dismissed the
action "for in fact no venue exists in this court pursuant to the
provisions of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. '53 Eck is
the only case clearly holding article 28(1) to be a venue provision
when none of the four contacts have been in the United States.
The decision is questionable since the court relied upon the venue
construction of Spencer and Mason in which United States con-
tacts were present.
Opposed to the above decisions are five cases viewing article
28(1) as a jurisdictional provision." These cases may be illustrated
by Nudo v. Sabena Belgian World Air Lines.55 None of the four
contacts was in the United States; the immediate destination of
the flight, the ultimate destination, the place of making the con-
tract, and the defendant's domicile and principal place of business
were all in Europe. Plaintiff vainly contended that there was a
United States contact because Sabena maintained a principal place
50. Ibid.
51. 9 Av. Cas. 17,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), reconsideration denied, 9 Av. Cas.
17,469 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
52. Id. at 17,324.
53. Ibid.
54. Kahn v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 9 Av. Cas. 17,107 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Nudo v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa.
1962); Bowen v. Port of New York Authority, 8 Av. Cas. 18,043 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1964); Gordon v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 7 Av. Cas. 18,114 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 1962); GaMli v. Re-Al Brazilian Intl Airlines, 7 Av. Cas. 17,614 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 1961).
55. 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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of business in Philadelphia. The court held there were no contacts
in the United States and, therefore, it had no jurisdiction."
Only six of the decisions which have considered the "jurisdic-
tion-venue" issue fall into the critical area in which the determi-
nation could be significant.57 Five of these hold that article 28(1)
is a jurisdictional provision." It is significant that in the one
decision which favored the venue construction," the determina-
tion was not outcome determinative since venue had not been
waived.
It seems to be finally settled that article 28(1) is to be construed
as applying nationally, i.e., to countries rather than to their po-
litical subdivisions. Under these conditions dismissing a suit for
improper venue under the convention as was done by the federal
court in Eck is unrealistic. In Eck it made no real difference which
way the court decided the issue since the plaintiff could not bring
her action anywhere in the United States under the court's reason-
ing. If a suit is dismissed for improper venue, it is implicit that
somewhere in the United States there is a proper forum to adjudi-
cate the plaintiff's claim. When it is clear, as in Eck, that the
action could not be heard in any American court, it would appear
more accurate and forthright to dismiss the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
It has been suggested that if there is an allegation that the
cause of action arises under a treaty of the United States,60 a
56. Id. at 192.
57. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 9 Av. Cas. 17,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
reconsideration denied, 9 Av. Cas. 17,469 (S.D.N.Y.); Kahm v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 9 Av. Cas. 17,107 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Nudo v. Sabena
Belgian World Airlines, 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Bowen v. Port of
New York Authority, 8 Av. Cas. 18,043 (Sup. C. N.Y. 1964); Gordon v.
Sabena Belgian World Airline, 7 Av. Cas. 18,114 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1962); Galli
v. Re-Al Brazilian Int'l Airlines, 7 Av. Cas. 17,614 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1961).
58. One court even dismissed an action for lack of jurisdiction even
though the accident occurred in the United States. See Bowen v. Port of New
York Authority, supra note 57.
59. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 9 Av. Cas. 17,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
recontideration denied, 9 Av. Cas. 17,469 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
60. See 38 No=n DAx. LAw. 103, 10 (1962). American decisions are
split on the question. Oampare Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 329
F.2d 302 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964); Salamon v. Koninklijke
Luchtvaart Maatschappj, 198 lisc. 780, 107 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd, 281 App. Div. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953); Garcia v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 183 Misc. 258, 50 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd,
269 App. Div. 237, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d
257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946) (holding a cause of action is created),
with Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp.
393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), Tev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953),
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jurisdictional interpretation of article 28(1) would expand the
jurisdiction of the federal courts by lowering the 10,000 dollars
minimum amount in controversy required by 28 U.S.C. section
1331(19) to the convention's limitation of 8,300 dollars for a
passenger's death or injury.6 1 The issue probably will seldom arise
since plaintiff will usually allege wilful misconduct, in which case
the convention's limitation of liability does not apply6 2 In addi-
tion, while the Warsaw Convention authorizes suits arising from
certain flights to be heard in the United States, there is no indica-
tion the provision was thought to guarantee a federal forum. It
should be noted that the question will become moot if the con-
vention is amended to provide higher damages, as has been pro-
posed."'
It has also been argued that a jurisdictional construction
could have the effect of expanding federal diversity jurisdiction to
allow suits between two foreign litigants in a federal court.V 4 At
the present time, the only case of this nature is Seth v. British
Overseas Airways Corp.*5 Jurisdiction in Seth, however, was
sustained under 28 U.S.C. section 1331(a) -as it was a civil
action arising under a treaty of the United States. Although
article 28(1) could authorize the United States as one of the
possible forums for two foreign litigants, there is no indication
that a plaintiff who bases his jurisdictional claim solely on diver-
sity is guaranteed access to a federal forum 6 In addition, a foreign
cert. denied, 848 U.S. 820 (1954); Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181
Misc. Q63, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d
785, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1944) (holding a cause of action is not created).
Most legal writers interpret the convention as creating a cause of action.
Mennell & Simeone, United States Policy and the Warsaw Convention,
2 WAsimuRa L.J. 219, 231 (1962); Steuben, Wrongful Death Actions Under
the Warsaw Convention, 11 BuAo L. Rav. 865 (1961). But see Prominsld,
Wrongful Death in Aviation: State, Federal, and Warsaw, 15 U. Mi im L. Rnv.
59 (1960).
61. Warsaw Convention art. 22(1). In the only case raising the issue,
Green v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 6 Av. Cas. 18,058 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), the
court refused to dismiss a personal injury action notwithstanding the fact
that after service of defendant's answer, the plaintiff conceded that the action
was governed by the Warsaw Convention and that defendant's liability was
limited to $8,800. However, Green can be explained on the narrow ground that
at the time suit was commenced the amount in controversy exceeded the juris-
diction requirement and that subsequent amendments lowering the claim for
relief would not oust jurisdiction. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red
Cab Co., 803 U.S. 288 (1938).
62. See Warsaw Convention art. 25.
68. See note 5 su2pra.
64. See 88 Nonm DAwm LAw. 108, 105 (1962).
65. 8s29 F.2d 802 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 879 U.S. 858 (1964).
66. Even if the convention does not create a cause of action, it could be
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plaintiff rarely would choose to sue a foreign airline in the United
States.
In the absence of a clear answer to the "jurisdiction-venue"
question in either the legislative history 7 or decisions it is appro-
priate to return to the starting point - article 28(1): "An action
for damages must be brought . . . ." (Emphasis added.) It is
submitted that in the face of this language it would be a violation
of our treaty commitment to construe the article to mean: An
action for damages may be brought in the United States if the
defendant is held to have waived his venue objections. This could
be the result of a venue characterization.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the "national" interpretation of article 28(1), it would
appear more desirable to construe the article as relating to juris-
diction. Under such a construction, an American court faced with
an action governed by the convention must first determine
whether one of the contacts occurred in the United States. If not,
it should recognize the article's jurisdictional limitation and dis-
miss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If one or
more contacts can be found in the United States, the court should
proceed to adjudicate the action with all procedural matters
decided in accordance with local law.
argued that if article 28 is jurisdictional it creates a new base of jurisdiction
in addition to diversity jurisdiction. The reasoning would be any time there
is a contact in the United States, federal courts have jurisdiction over the
action notwithstanding lack of diversity or a cause of action arising from a
federal statute or treaty. There is no authority for this argument. Given the
complete absence of legislative history indicating Congress intended this
result, it is highly unlikely that a court would adopt this approach to expand
federal jurisdiction.
This discussion has centered around the federal court system because it
is a system of limited jurisdiction- the subject matter must be set out in
the Constitution and specifically granted by Congress. See Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 238 (1922). The state courts are not so limited but
derive their jurisdiction from the traditional power of the courts of a sovereign
state.
67. What legislative history there is on this point is ambiguous. In discuss-
ing the article, the drafters of the convention frequently referred to "juris-
diction" while the term "venue" was not used at all. Warsaw Conference
Documents, pp. 77-79, quoted in Calkins, supra note 31, at 229-30.
There is no evidence that the United States Senate considered the question
when it advised adherence to the convention. See Spencer v. Northwest
Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504, 506 (1962). But cf. 49 Stat. 3020
(1934), where the marginal description of the subject matter of article 28(1)
is "Venue of Action."
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